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I. Introduction 
 In February 2014, a coal ash pond in Eden, North Carolina spilled into the Dan River, 
unleashing up to 82,000 tons of the toxic black sludge from a retired coal plant. Coal ash, a 
byproduct of burning coal for electricity, contains toxic and carcinogenic elements such as 
arsenic and heavy metals (Shoichet 2014). There are 14 coal-fired power plants that produce coal 
ash and 32 unlined coal ash ponds throughout the state, which risk further water contamination 
from potential leakages (Gabriel 2014). Environmental groups aspire to require the cleanup and 
strict regulation of coal ash impoundments, and hold state agencies and Duke Energy 
accountable for preventing similar ecological disasters in the future (Shoichet 2014).  
 North Carolina is also embroiled in a dispute over the development of horizontal 
hydraulic fracturing (fracking), a relatively new technology that enables the extraction of natural 
gas from previously inaccessible underground sources. To remove the natural gas, large 
quantities of water are combined with sand and a mixture of chemicals and shot down into wells 
under high pressure. This process is an environmental concern due to the potential for ground 
and surface water contamination, as some of the chemicals used in fracking are carcinogenic. 
Fracking also requires high volumes of water that may exacerbate water scarcity in water 
stressed areas (Hagström and Adams 2012). Interest groups are involved in both sides of the 
argument, as industrial interests and pro-fracking legislators are pushing for the legislature to 
expedite the process to allow fracking, while environmental groups want to keep fracking out of 
the state or require additional research on its safety before allowing natural gas companies to 
drill (Moskowitz 2014).   
 This thesis explores the effectiveness of environmental non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) on influencing government policy toward environmental issues such as water pollution 
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and non-renewable energy production. As a whole, these organizations seek to influence 
government to pass legislation aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, protecting 
endangered species and wilderness areas from agriculture and development, and reducing the 
harmful byproducts of industrialization such as air and water pollution. This form of public 
advocacy commonly includes lobbying legislators, filing amicus briefs, utilizing citizen suits, 
conducting media campaigns, and backing certain political candidates (Szarka 2013). 
 The question of environmental NGOs’ ability to effectively bring about environmental 
conservation is important because their potential failure implies the need for different methods to 
further environmental protection. Environmental issues such as climate change, biodiversity loss, 
and habitat degradation pose a myriad of problems to environmental health and sustainability as 
well as to human health (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014). As the United 
States contains both a multitude of environmental issues that necessitate mitigation and a 
considerable number of environmental NGOs, I focus on domestic NGOs and their influence on 
governmental policy toward environmental issues. Specifically, I am examining the role of 
environmental NGOs in North Carolina and the effectiveness of their efforts to prevent the 
development of hydraulic fracturing and the occurrence of coal ash leakages caused by 
inadequate disposal. Both fracking and coal ash disposal are currently controversial political 
issues in the state, and are reflected in the legislation of the North Carolina General Assembly 
(NCGA).   
 In this thesis, I investigate if lobbying enables environmental NGOs to effectively 
instigate the passage of pro-environmental legislation. My major focus is the role of 
environmental NGOs’ lobbying efforts on influencing government policy in North Carolina, and 
the main aim of this thesis is to determine whether or not their efforts contribute to the passage of 
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bills in the NCGA with favorable environmental outcomes. I examine the lobbying effort of 
members of the following environmental organizations, which comprise all of the environmental 
organizations that lobbied the NCGA about coal ash regulation and fracking in 2014: Southern 
Environmental Law Center, American Rivers, Upper Neuse Riverkeeper Foundation, Sierra Club 
N.C. Chapter, Environmental Defense Fund, N.C. Conservation Network, Environment North 
Carolina, and the N.C. League of Conservation Voters.  
 The structure of this thesis is as follows: first, there is a literature review on the strategies 
environmental NGOs utilize to achieve their goals and an examination of the overall 
effectiveness of those strategies, particularly lobbying. There will then be a section on the 
contribution of my thesis to this existing body of research. Next, theory will be presented about 
what causal mechanisms can explain how environmental NGOs affect government actions, and 
two hypotheses will be proposed. Following is a section on my research design and the measures 
of the effectiveness of NGOs’ strategies in North Carolina, followed by an analysis of the results 
and a section on my interviews with environmental lobbyists. Lastly, there will be a discussion 
of the limitations of my analysis and suggestions for future research.  
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II. Literature Review 
Strategies of Environmental Non-profit Organizations 
  Many scholars have examined the strategies of environmental NGOs and of advocacy 
organizations in general, and have identified the mechanisms by which these organizations 
attempt to exact change. An understanding of the breadth of the work of NGOs is important to 
understand where lobbying fits into the overall picture of environmental non-profit advocacy. 
Andrews and Edwards (2004) identify that advocacy organizations attempt to drive policy 
decisions through “agenda setting, accessing decision-making arenas, achieving favorable 
policies, monitoring and shaping implementation, and shifting the long-term priorities and 
resources of political institutions” (497). Through agenda setting, NGOs bring awareness to their 
chosen issues in order to shape public opinion and policy, often through education campaigns 
and demonstrations. More directly, NGOs aim to influence policy by lobbying administrative 
agencies and legislative bodies (Andrews and Edwards 2004). I focus on the effectiveness of 
environmental NGO lobbying on legislature, specifically the N.C. General Assembly.  
 Szarka (2013) expands on the advocacy strategies of environmental NGOs focused on 
climate change mitigation. He finds that environmental NGOs divide their focus between 
mustering public support via “naming and shaming” organizations at fault, and litigation and 
“extra-legal pressure” (Szarka 2013, 13). Similarly to Andrews’ and Edwards’ analysis of 
general NGO tactics, Szarka finds that environmental NGOs practice “issue framing, knowledge 
generation and dissemination, attribution of responsibility, political lobbying, public 
mobilization, and agenda setting” (Szarka, 2013, 13).  
  In Szarka’s article, issue framing is the framing of a problem with the intention to inspire 
action and legitimize the agenda of an NGO. Environmental NGOs tend to present 
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environmental issues such as climate change through the lens of having negative repercussions 
on ecosystem health, as an economic problem needing advanced technical solutions, or as a 
social injustice. Environmental NGOs disseminate knowledge of their chosen issues to the public 
in order to raise awareness, influence consumer choices, and publicize political parties 
responsible for environmental problems (Szarka 2013). Dreiling, Lougee, and Nakamura (2008) 
identify methods by which environmental non-profits conduct public awareness campaigns and 
disseminate information about their chosen issues. These campaigns include publicity and 
awareness for non-members, action alerts, canvassing, lobbying, and petitioning (Dreiling, 
Lougee, and Nakamura 2008).  
 In addition to raising awareness, NGOs assign blame to groups responsible for creating 
environmental problems such as emitting high amounts of greenhouse gases, called “naming and 
shaming” (Szarka 2013, 13). NGOs hope to increase the accountability of these groups in order 
to motivate them to mitigate the environmental degradation they create. NGOs also lobby 
national governments on environmental issues by formulating proposals, attempting to affect 
policy negotiations, and policing policy implementation. Most environmental NGOs use public 
mobilization to increase issue visibility and put pressure on policymakers, which is related to 
knowledge generation and dissemination. Lastly, environmental NGOs often set strict standards 
in their agendas in order to raise public expectation for the actions of policymakers (Szarka 
2013). This may also hold true for the policy recommendations of environmental lobbyists 
seeking to influence legislators.  
 Grossmann (2006) compares 92 environmental NGOs to 1,600 other D.C.-area advocacy 
organizations, and finds that environmental NGOs are generally comparable to other NGOs in 
terms of media appearances and communication directed at policymakers. What sets 
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environmental NGOs apart from other NGOs is their active role in litigation; they are mentioned 
four times as often in federal court documents than non-environmental NGOs (Grossman 2006, 
633). Environmental NGOs are also less involved in Political Action Committees, have larger 
political staffs, and hire fewer external lobbyists than other advocacy organizations (633). Yet in 
terms of public awareness and mobilization, environmental NGOs do not significantly differ 
from other NGOs (634). Due to these general similarities, it is feasible to utilize literature that 
examines the role of non-profit and advocacy groups as a whole in order to glean more 
information and develop hypotheses about the effectiveness of the lobbying efforts of 
environmental NGOs specifically.  
Interest Groups and Lobbying  
 In a review of hundreds of case studies concerning American interest groups and 
lobbying, Baumgartner and Leech (1998), find that despite decades of analysis on the role of 
interest groups in American politics, the empirical findings of their lobbying success are often 
contradictory and inconclusive. In their analysis of 15 quantitative lobbying studies, 
Baumgartner and Leech determine that the small scope and theoretical differences among 
scholars makes generalization about the effects of interest groups difficult. Additionally, both 
lobbying and the congressional response to lobbying are driven by the specific content and 
policy at hand. Many studies did not take into account the power of those who were opposing the 
interest group being studied. An example relevant to this thesis is business interests opposing 
environmental groups. Of the findings, the authors identify that over half of the previous studies 
found that lobbying has a positive effect on the success of interest groups (Baumgartner and 
Leech 1998, 133).  
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 Many previous studies of interest group influence ignore the role of groups before role 
call voting, such as in committees where bills are drafted and in the interpersonal relationships 
between legislators and lobbyists. There are subtleties to the ways groups influence a bill; 
lobbyists may be able to change the content of a bill but not manage to pass or defeat the bill in 
its entirety. Also, groups lobbying Congress may be effective in changing the terms of a debate 
rather than convincing individual legislators to change their minds about a given issue. Lobbyists 
that work on controversial issues known to the public are more likely to concentrate their efforts 
on the floor of House and Senate than lobbyists working on noncontroversial issues, who more 
often lobby in committees (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 138). As fracking and coal ash 
legislation are controversial issues closely followed by the public, this research focuses on the 
votes of legislators on the floor, after a bill has gone through committee.  
 Lobbyists for interest groups usually combine a wide array of tactics to influence 
legislators. Tactics vary widely and depend on the issue at hand, but frequently reported tactics 
in the 15 lobbying studies include direct lobbying of legislators, testimony at legislative hearings, 
presentation of research, coalition formation with other groups, strategizing with government 
officials, speaking with journalists, funding advertisements, drafting legislation, agenda-setting, 
letter writing, participating in litigation, candidate endorsements, campaign contributions, and 
demonstrations (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 152). In studies of lobbyists and their tactics, 
direct lobbying and letter writing were found to be the most effective ways to influence a 
legislature. The presentation of research was also ranked as highly effective. Testifying at 
legislative hearings was found to have mixed results on influencing a legislature (Baumgartner 
and Leech 1998, 156). This thesis investigates the interaction between direct lobbying and roll 
call votes of the N.C. General Assembly.  
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 Despite the prevalence of inconclusive findings in lobbying literature, two main 
approaches to lobbying stand out. They are characterized by lobbying as an exchange of 
information among allies and as the persuasion of legislators of the opposite camp (Hall and 
Deardorff 2006). Lobbyists are known to concentrate their efforts on legislators who also hold 
their views toward the issue that they lobby. Hall and Deardorff propose a complementing 
approach to lobbying as an exchange of information with a model of lobbying as legislative 
subsidy. Lobbying serves as a legislative subsidy when lobbyists seek to influence their political 
allies by providing information and labor, and legislators seek information and services from 
likeminded lobbyists. Legislators trust lobbyists that hold their views and are furnished with the 
material to create proposals and amendments, formulate strategies, and make arguments. In turn, 
lobbyists allocate their resources only towards the legislators who are likely to further lobbyists’ 
policy preferences. An implication of this model is that public interest groups may have less 
influence over legislative behavior, as business interests with greater financial resources 
dominate federal lobbying and are more able to support legislators who share their preferences 
(Hall and Deardorff 2006, 81). This thesis will investigate this implication and determine if the 
relative strength of group interests, such as the oil and gas industry, overpower the efforts of 
environmental lobbyists.  
 Lowery (2013) investigates the prevalence of null findings in research on the influence of 
interest organizations and lobbying in democratic politics. He argues that the concept of 
influence is more subtle and difficult to observe and measure than previous scholars of interest 
organizations have considered. He finds that the examination of lobbying tactics and strategies 
on specific policy proposals may be ineffective if interest groups gain most of their influence via 
agenda setting, “largely rigging the game before it has even begun” (Lowery 2013, 8).  The 
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deeper influence of shaping what issues come to legislative attention may account for the 
difficulty in finding evidence of interest groups successfully achieving their policy goals through 
lobbying. In addition to losing out against opposing interest groups over policy proposals, 
interest groups may fail to secure space on crowded policy agendas. In this case, simply getting 
onto the legislative agenda may constitute a victory for interest groups regardless of final 
legislative outcomes. Additionally, given the plethora of both competing policy issues and 
interest groups, it is difficult to identity the cause of an interest group’s failure. Lowery notes that 
many previous studies of interest group influence that have null findings neglect to analyze the 
role of lobbyists working on the opposing side of an issue (11). My thesis attempts to guard 
against this omission with the inclusion of industrial interests in North Carolina with a vested 
interest in coal ash and fracking regulation.  
Theories of Environmental Lobbying 
 The organizations that lobby environmental policy issues at the federal level tend to fall 
into three groups: the industrial sector and business associations, nonprofit public interest groups, 
and scientific and research organizations. Of these groups, industrial groups are the most well 
funded and well staffed, and are often accompanied by Political Action Committees that have 
their own lobbying operations. Environmental groups attempt to counter the lobbying and 
financial power of industrial interests by increasing membership and calling for contributions to 
their organizations (Chepesiuk 1994).  
 Though there are multiple empirical studies concerning lobbying among interest groups 
in general and literature delineating the strategies of environmental NGOs, there has been little 
empirical research conducted about the effectiveness or success of environmental NGO lobbying 
on legislative decisions. However, there are several conceptual theories of environmental 
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lobbying, particularly from the standpoint of industrial interests. Tim Friehe (2013) asserts that 
environmental lobbying may lead polluting industries to install advanced emissions abatement 
technologies in order to lower environmental lobbyists’ effort on pushing for emissions taxes. 
The framework establishes that a monopolistic polluting industry would adopt a more advanced 
emissions reduction technology than it would otherwise choose if doing so diminishes the 
environmental lobbying effort for higher emissions taxes (Friehe 2013). Similarly, Polk and 
Schmutzler (2005) show that the concentrated effort of environmental lobbyists against polluting 
industries that participate in loophole lobbying detracts the polluting industries away from more 
general lobbying against environmental regulation. Loophole lobbying is defined as lobbying for 
laxer regulations for a specific industry, whereas general lobbying against environmental 
regulations is not industry-specific. When an industry has a limited budget, it will focus on 
loophole lobbying at the expense of general lobbying. Concentration on industry-specific 
loophole lobbying diverts industries away from general lobbying for less strict environmental 
policy, and enables environmental lobbyists to successfully push for greater environmental 
regulation and fewer emissions (Polk and Schmutzler 2005).  
 Tetsuo Ono (2009) examines the effect of environmental lobbying in terms of public 
spending over generations with a model analyzing the interplay of an environmental coalition of 
the young that desires increases in environmental protection and an older generation that seeks to 
preserve public spending towards social security benefits. The presence of environmental 
lobbying may realize higher environmental quality, but at the expense of lower lifetime utility 
over the long run as government resources are allocated away from social security spending and 
household consumption increases in turn (Ono 2009).   
--------- 
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 In summary, existing literature about environmental NGOs identifies the causal 
mechanisms by which these NGOs aim to influence government policy and conduct public 
awareness campaigns. Andrews and Edwards explain in detail how many varieties of NGOs 
attempt to impact policy. Szarka delineates the specific advocacy strategies utilized by 
environmental NGOs, which are similar to those of other types of NGO. Grossmann finds that 
environmental NGOs are similar to all other non-profit groups in Washington, although one of 
their defining factors is the increased role of litigation. Dreiling, Lougee, and Nakamura have 
findings that imply that environmental NGOs that have an emphasis on lobbying and litigation 
may be better organized than other NGOs.  
 Notwithstanding the wide variety of lobbying techniques, previous research about the 
role, strategies, and effectiveness of interest groups and lobbying in American politics are often 
contradictory and inconclusive. Baumgartner and Leech identify that the majority of previous 
studies about interest groups find that lobbying has a positive effect on their success. They find 
that of the wide array of tactics employed by interest group lobbyists, the lobbyists rate direct 
lobbying as one of the most effective. Hall and Deardorff and Chepesiuk conclude that public 
interest groups may be disadvantaged in federal lobbying by the greater financial resources of 
business interests. Lowery asserts that the complexity of observing and measuring interest group 
influence often leads to null findings in studies of interest group lobbying effectiveness, 
particularly when concerning agenda setting.  
  Lastly, theoretical models of environmental lobbying propose that business interests may 
react to environmental lobbying in ways that benefit environmental quality, but do not lead to the 
passage or blockage of legislation per se. Friehe finds that polluting industries may install 
advanced emissions abatement technologies in order to avoid higher emissions taxes resulting 
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from pushback from environmental lobbying groups. Polk and Schmutzler argue that 
environmental groups may help obtain stricter environmental regulations against polluting 
industries by countering the loophole lobbying of polluting industries with greater lobbying for 
general environmental regulations. Tetsuo Ono shows that based on assumptions of young and 
old political actors, environmental lobbying can bring about higher environmental quality, 
though at the expense of intergenerational lifetime utility.  
 However, few scholars have quantified environmental organizations’ effectiveness on 
successfully influencing government policy specifically through their lobbying efforts. This 
thesis contributes to this existing literature by examining the effectiveness of environmental 
NGOs on influencing government legislation through their advocacy efforts, specifically through 
lobbying. It aims to discover if NGOs can aid in bringing about laws that seek to mitigate 
harmful environmental issues such as water pollution. Bills for which environmental NGOs have 
taken part in lobbying members of the North Carolina legislature are studied to determine if the 
outcome of state legislation was influenced in part due to the advocacy of environmental NGOs. 
As previous authors have identified the strategies and scope of environmental NGOs, the role of 
interest groups in lobbying, and theories of environmental lobbying, the point of my study is to 
discover how environmental NGOs can substantively influence policy through lobbying.  
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III. Theory  
 It is hypothesized that environmental NGOs can influence government policy through 
lobbying members of state or federal legislatures in order to influence the passage of policy with 
favorable environmental outcomes. Favorable environmental outcomes are defined as 
government action that aims to mitigate harmful effects of human activity on the environment, 
such as climate change or water pollution from insufficient industrial waste disposal or runoff. 
When analyzing my case studies of fracking and coal ash in North Carolina, I define favorable 
environmental outcomes as the passage of legislation in the General Assembly or the enactment 
of policies within state environmental regulatory agencies that do not further the possibility of 
water pollution from these activities. Thus, favorable environmental outcomes are legislation that 
prohibits the inadequate storage of coal ash and forbids further unlined and uncapped coal ash 
impoundments, and either prohibits the establishment of fracking in North Carolina or minimizes 
its impact in the state through increased environmental safety measures, zoning restrictions, and 
restricted permits.  
 My theoretical argument is that lobbying leads to the education and persuasion of 
legislators about environmental issues, and subsequently legislation that could lessen detrimental 
human effects on the environment. The information supplied by the lobbyists provides legislators 
with the scientific knowledge of which they may otherwise be unaware. When members of the 
General Assembly are persuaded, lobbyists can help draft legislation with ideal environmental 
outcomes, which if adopted may then lead to successful environmental policies. This mechanism 
may sound naïvely simplistic in the face of the realities of lobbying and larger industrial interests 
with strong lobbies that have much more financial value than environmental NGOs. However, 
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this is a tactic taken by prominent environmental NGOs, and a critical look at its effectiveness 
has implications for future actions taken to further environmentally sustainable policies.  
 Within my analysis of environmental NGOs and their effects on state legislation in North 
Carolina is the necessity to take into account the effect of the political situation within the state 
legislature. The political party in control of the General Assembly heavily influences the passage 
or failure of pro-environmental legislation. The party in control of the General Assembly may 
reduce the effectiveness of environmental NGOs on shaping policy because the political 
objectives of a party may directly oppose those of an NGO, which can alter the outcome of their 
lobbying efforts. The effectiveness of an NGO’s lobbying may differ depending on partisan 
control and the value a party places on environmental protection as opposed to industrial 
interests.  
Institutional Backdrop   
 In order to measure the effectiveness of environmental NGOs’ efforts through time and to 
take into account the effect of partisan control of the state legislature, I analyze the level of 
activity of NGOs both before and after the Republican-majority control of both houses of the 
North Carolina General Assembly and the governorship from the years 2007 through 2014 (See 
Table 1). The General Assembly session of 2011-2012 marked a partisan turnover, with a 
Republican majority in both houses in addition to a Republican governor. The North Carolina 
government remains a Republican stronghold up through the present, with a Republican majority 
in both houses of the General Assembly and Republican Governor McCrory (North Carolina 
Legislative Library 2014). Prior to McCrory’s term, two Democrats held the governor’s seat, 
with Mike Easley serving from 2001-2009 and Beverly Perdue from 2009-2013 (National 
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Governors Association 2014). The partisan control of the state government may affect how 
environmental NGOs interact with legislators and the type of strategies that they utilize.  
Table 1: N.C. General Assembly Party Affiliations 2007-2014 
Year House 
Democrats 
House 
Republicans 
Senate 
Democrats 
Senate 
Republicans 
2007-2008 68 52 31 19 
2009-2010 68 52 30 20 
2011-2012 52 68 19 31 
2013-2014 43 77 17 33 
(North Carolina Legislative Library 2014)  
 
Positions of the Parties  
 The national Republican Party platform emphasizes the importance of job creation and 
continued use of coal-fired power plants, in addition to supporting the development of hydraulic 
fracturing to increase the exploitation of America’s oil and natural gas reserves. The platform 
calls for the elimination of environmental regulation on energy sources in favor of “the free 
market and the public’s preferences to determine the industry outcomes” (Republican National 
Committee 2012). The N.C. Republican Party platform calls for an energy policy that includes 
onshore oil and natural gas drilling, explicitly through hydraulic fracturing. It presents a negative 
attitude on environmental regulation and favors regulation based on cost-benefit analysis. 
Additionally, the platform supports the repeal of the state renewable energy mandate (North 
Carolina Republican Party 2014).  
 The national Democratic Party platform states a commitment to environmental protection 
while seeking to develop domestic energy sources, including natural gas. The platform supports 
generating greatly increased levels of domestic energy from clean and renewable energy sources. 
In regards to hydraulic fracturing, the Democratic platform supports safeguards against water 
and air pollution through federal regulation (Democratic National Committee 2012). The N.C. 
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Democratic Party platform calls for environmental protection and emphasizes sustainable and 
renewable energy sources, though it does not specifically mention its stance on hydraulic 
fracturing. The platform calls for alternative ways to dispose of chemical and waste byproducts 
and supports initiatives to protect air and water quality (North Carolina Democratic Party 2012).  
 As the Democratic Party tends to be more amenable to environmental concerns and the 
Republican Party generally favors business interests and economic growth over environmental 
conservation, it is likely that environmental NGOs will have had to adjust their strategies 
towards influencing the state government. As the General Assembly gradually became more 
Republican and therefore less likely to achieve favorable environmental outcomes, 
environmental NGOs would likely have had to concentrate less on supporting bills that would 
further environmental conservation and more on attempting to block bills that would potentially 
harm the environment. The definition of success for environmental NGOs may shift as the 
partisan environment becomes more hostile towards conservation measures. When faced with a 
Republican majority, NGOs may need to concentrate on blocking the most environmentally 
harmful legislation instead of supporting bills that further environmental interests.  
-------- 
 Here are my two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Lobbying serves as an educational tool for legislators, and the lobbying efforts of 
environmental NGOs on influencing government legislation towards environmental issues will 
lead to better environmental outcomes for these issues than legislation that is created without 
their efforts.  
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Hypothesis 2: My null hypothesis is that legislative decisions are unaffected by environmental 
lobbying. Legislators’ attitudes towards environmental issues such as fracking and coal ash 
regulation are not influenced by environmental NGOs lobbying efforts.  
 Once again, I define “better environmental outcomes” as government action that aims to 
lessen the detrimental effects that human activity causes the natural environment. I expect that 
environmental NGOs’ lobbying efforts towards state legislators and environmental agencies like 
the N.C. Department of Environment and Natural Resources will positively influence the 
legislation of those bodies. Under Republican leadership this may not mean the passage of bills 
that include conservation measures, but rather the rejection of bills that increase the likelihood of 
environmental damage.  
IV. Data and Methodology 
 I explore my hypotheses by looking at legislative proposals involving the issues of coal 
ash and hydraulic fracturing in North Carolina between the years 2007 and 2014. This time span 
allows me to analyze how the strategies and effectiveness of environmental NGOs changed with 
the turnover in partisan leadership. I examine the effectiveness of environmental NGOs on 
influencing government policy towards legislation that affects environmental health through 
analyzing bills involving coal ash regulation and hydraulic fracturing in North Carolina.  
 The quantitative analysis for my thesis is comprised of an analysis of the 25 bills 
generated in the General Assembly concerning coal ash and fracking from 2007-2014, and the 
legislative success of the eight environmental NGOs in North Carolina that lobby the NCGA on 
these issues. Table 2 shows a description of the 25 bills of interest and their outcomes in the 
NCGA, and is followed by brief summaries of their relevant contents. 
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Table 2: Bill Descriptions 
No. Bill 
Number 
Year Bill Title Partisanship 
of Sponsors 
Pass or 
Fail 
1 H1233 2007 Solid Waste Management Act of 2007 Democrat Fail 
2 S716 2007 Solid Waste Management Amends. 2007 Bipartisan Fail 
3 S1492 2007 Solid Waste Management Act of 2007 Democrat Pass 
4 S6 2007 Amend Solid Waste Management Act of 2007 Bipartisan Pass 
5 H1354 2009 Increase Public Safety for Coal Ash Disposal Democrat Fail 
6 H2012 2010 Regulate Certain Coal-Ash Structural Fill Democrat Fail 
7 S1419 2010 Regulate Certain Coal-Ash Structural Fill Democrat Fail 
8 H722 2011 Omnibus Act Regarding Coal-Based Energy Democrat Fail 
9 H242 2011 Natural Gas/Bond/Fee/Landowner 
Protection/Study 
Bipartisan Pass 
10 S615 2011 Natural Gas Exploration/ Bond and Study Bipartisan Fail 
11 S709 2011 Energy Jobs Act Republican Pass, but 
vetoed 
12 H953 2012 Amend Environmental Laws 2 Republican Pass 
13 S820 2012 Clean Energy and Economic Security Act Republican Pass 
14 H1054 2012 Clean Energy and Economic Security Act Bipartisan Fail 
15 H1064 2012 Shale Gas/Develop Regulatory Program/ 
Legislative Oversight 
Republican Fail 
16 H1185 2012 Fracking Contracts/ Against Public Policy Democrat Fail 
17 S328 2013 Solid Waste Management Reform Act of 2013 Republican Fail 
18 H613 2013 Omnibus Act Regarding Coal-Based Energy Democrat Fail 
19 S76 2013 Domestic Energy Jobs Act Republican Pass 
20 H94 2013 Amend Environmental Laws 2013 Republican Fail 
21 S729 2014 Coal Ash Management Act of 2014 Republican Pass 
22 H1226 2014 Coal Ash Management Act of 2014 Democrat Fail 
23 H1228 2014 Governor’s Coal Ash Action Plan Republican Fail 
24 S856 2014 Coal Ash Management Act of 2014 Democrat Fail 
25 S786 2014 Energy Modernization Act Republican Pass 	  	  
1. DENR to direct a comprehensive solid waste management program, solid waste facilities 
forbidden in environmentally sensitive and culturally significant areas, no franchise 
required for coal ash landfills, owner responsible for landfill for the life of the facility, 
increased penalties for violations of nonhazardous waste, environmental compliance 
review for applicants and permit holders, required buffer zones between waterways, 
establish a commission on solid waste management, tax imposed on solid waste; 
proceeds go towards remediation of orphan landfills and hazardous waste sites. 
2. Establish a moratorium on new landfills until further study, DENR to establish a 
comprehensive waste management program, repeal exemption of Environmental Impact 
Statements for landfills operated by local governments, establish environmental grounds 
for DENR to deny a landfill permit, public hearing for landfill proposals, no franchise 
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required for coal ash landfills, financial responsibility requirements for lifetime of solid 
waste facility, environmental compliance review requirements for applicants, 3-tiered 
lining for coal ash landfills, response plan with remedial actions in the event of coal ash 
leaks, Environmental Review Commission to study franchise of solid waste. 
3. DENR to direct a comprehensive solid waste management program, DENR to deny 
applications for solid waste facilities that would violate water quality standards 
established by the Environmental Management Commission (EMC), threaten 
ecologically sensitive or culturally significant areas, or negatively impact minority or 
low-income communities, no franchise required for coal ash landfills, increased fees for 
violations involving nonhazardous waste, financial responsibility requirements for permit 
holders for the lifetime of the facility, environmental compliance review requirements for 
applicants, 3-tiered lining for coal ash landfills, response plan with remedial action in 
case of coal ash leaks, required study of environmental impact and local ordinances, 
required buffer zones between water sources, leachate collection system established, but 
more stringent requirements do not apply to coal ash landfills, tax imposed on solid 
waste; proceeds go towards remediation of orphan landfills and hazardous waste sites. 
4. The more stringent solid waste management requirements will not apply to landfills 
permitted before June 2006 or coal ash landfills, and reimbursement is possible for 
landfill applicants who applied for permits prior to August 2006. 
5. The definition of coal ash “combustion products” is clarified to expand requirements for 
permitting coal ash combustion products landfills and structural fill facilities, no 
combustion products landfills may be constructed or expanded in ecologically sensitive 
areas, landfills must be covered and have 3-tiered bottom liners, applicants must have 
emergency response plans, coal ash impoundments are forbidden to be constructed after 
2010, and those existing will be monitored and phased out, regulation of coal ash 
impoundments moves from N.C. Utilities Commission to DENR. 
6. Expands the definition of “fully encapsulated” coal ash impoundments and “structural 
fill,” directs DENR to develop a permit system for the reuse of combustion products in 
solid waste disposal sites unless the end product is fully encapsulated, and establishes 
application fees. 
7. See 6.  
8. Prohibit electric utilities from purchasing coal that was extracted via mountaintop 
removal, expands the definition of “fully encapsulated” coal ash impoundments and 
“structural fill,” directs DENR to develop a permit system for the reuse of combustion 
products in solid waste disposal sites unless the end product is fully encapsulated, 
establishes application fees, and places a moratorium on the construction of additional 
non-carbon neutral coal-fired power plants. 
9. $5,000 bond fee set for proposed natural gas drilling operations, as well as a $3,000 fee 
for each well and a $450 fee in case of well abandonment, oil and gas developers must 
give notice of entry to property owners, surface owners are owed compensation for 
damages to water supply and personal property, maximum lease term is 10 years, DENR 
shall conduct an in-depth study of fracking and its potential impacts in the Triassic Basin, 
and DENR shall hold two public hearings regarding fracking in the Triassic Basin. 
10. Raise the bond fee required for natural gas drilling from $5,000 to $10,000; direct DENR 
to study the impact and potential of fracking in the Triassic Basin. 
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11. Plans to establish an emergency response fund of $500,000,000 from royalties and 
revenue from offshore and onshore energy production, develop a Governors’ Regional 
Interstate Offshore Energy Policy Compact between North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Virginia in order to direct the Governor to hasten the development of offshore oil drilling, 
direct DENR and the Energy Jobs Council to develop a comprehensive report on fracking 
and develop a regulatory framework, and create an Energy Jobs Council to direct 
increased energy production in North Carolina. 
12. Pushes back the date that the fracking study delineated in S820 would be presented to the 
Joint Legislative Commission on Energy Policy, and allows for a seven day, rather than a 
three day, right of rescission for leases of oil and gas rights.  
13. Authorizes oil and gas drilling but prohibits the issuance of permits until the development 
of a regulatory program for fracking, establishes the N.C. Mining and Energy 
Commission to issue orders pursuant to the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, determines 
how members of the N.C. Mining and Energy Commission (MEC) will be selected, 
orders a Committee on Civil Penalty Remissions from those members, orders that the 
MEC regulate the lifecycle of oil drilling, protect environmental health, prevent water 
pollution from drilling activities, collect baseline data, manage fracking waste, and 
develop emergency protocols, exempts the disclosure of fracking chemicals that are 
protected as trade secrets, establishes that DENR and the MEC have the authority to 
conduct inspections, increases daily fines for those who violate the provisions of this bill, 
the Environmental Management Commission and Commission for Public Health will 
adopt rules pertaining to fracking regulation, order the study of compulsory pooling, 
states that the general statute on toxic discharges cannot prohibit the injection of fracking 
fluid, oil and gas drillers will be presumed liable for water contamination and will be 
obliged to provide the surface owner with replacement water supply when necessary, 
landowner’s rights must be presented to the surface owner prior to drilling, pre-drilling 
testing of water supplies on drilling property is required, property owner has a three-day 
right of rescission for gas and oil rights, oil and gas drillers must minimize damage to the 
property owner’s land, and creates a Joint Legislative Commission on Energy Policy to 
monitor the actions of the MEC. 
14. Establishes an Oil and Gas Board (OGB) to move forward with oil and gas exploration, 
gives the OGB powers concurrent to DENR, gives the Board authority to access all 
fracking-related data except chemical disclosures designated as trade secrets, to hold 
hearings and conduct inspections, to adopt rules for the regulation of fracking activities, 
including pre-drilling water testing, to place limits on water use, manage fracking waste, 
and develop of emergency protocols and safety procedures, states that the OGB has 
quasi-judicial powers, determines who members of the OGB will be selected, makes 
fracking data, with the exemption of chemical disclosures that are trade secrets, available 
to the public two years after it has been received by the OGB, states that the general 
statute on toxic discharges cannot prohibit the injection of fracking fluid, DENR is not 
allowed to limit or hinder the development of fracking, a moratorium on fracking permits 
is in place until the OGB establishes a regulatory program, local ordinances cannot 
prohibit fracking within their jurisdiction, the OGB can preempt zoning laws, the OGB is 
subject to judicial review, and creates a Joint Legislative Commission on Energy Policy 
to monitor the actions of the OGB. 
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15. Directs DENR to develop an oil and gas regulatory program, evaluate the efficacy of 
creating an Oil and Gas Board in lieu of the Environmental Management Commission 
and Mining Commission, develop recommendations on levels of funding to operate the 
regulatory program, study fracking’s potential impact on localities, prepare emergency 
response plans, propose landowner and consumer protections, develop proposals holding 
drilling operators liable for groundwater contamination, and develop a fracking 
permitting process, states that oil and gas drillers will be presumed liable for water 
contamination, landowner’s rights must be presented to the surface owner prior to 
drilling, pre-drilling testing of water supplies on drilling property is required, oil and gas 
drillers must minimize damage to the property owner’s land, delineates increased daily 
fines for those who violate the provisions of this bill, orders a study of compulsory 
pooling, and creates a Joint Legislative Commission on Energy Policy to monitor all state 
agents involved in fracking regulation.  
16. Declares fracking a threat to public health and safety and deems contracts conveying the 
lease of oil and gas rights for the purpose of extraction void and unenforceable, and 
directs $25,000 to the Department of Justice to study the voided fracking contracts. 
17. Extends the duration of sanitary landfill permits for up to 30 years, with limited review 
every 5 years, repeals the Solid Waste Management Act of 2007, removes provision that 
would prohibit the construction of landfills in ecologically or culturally significant areas 
and floodplains, no franchise is required for coal ash landfills, riparian buffers are 
required but can be less than 100 feet, landfills are permitted up to 1,500 feet away from 
national and state-protected land, removes provision stating that landfill leachate lines 
must be cleaned, landfill covers do not need to be location-specific, more stringent 
requirements for new landfills do not apply to coal ash, landfill operators no longer have 
to establish the $2,000,000 cost for potential assessment and corrective action, and solid 
waste transfer containers are no longer required to be leak-proof. 
18. Prohibits electric utilities from purchasing coal that was extracted via mountaintop 
removal, expands the definition of “fully encapsulated” coal ash impoundments and 
“structural fill,” directs DENR to develop a permit system for the reuse of combustion 
products in solid waste disposal sites unless the end product is fully encapsulated, and 
establishes application fees, places a moratorium on the construction of additional non-
carbon neutral coal-fired power plants, and orders a report on the divestment of public 
funds in any company involved in the extraction of fossil fuels. 
19. The regulatory program for fracking will be put in place by October 2014, and DENR is 
authorized to issue fracking permits in March 2015, which will become effective when 
the NCGA takes affirmative legislative action, orders a study of severance taxes to be 
imposed in association with fracking activities, assesses the amount of funding necessary 
to maintain the regulatory program and for emergency response, modifies the selection of 
members to the N.C. Mining and Energy Commission, establishes criminal penalties for 
persons involved in oil and gas drilling that violate registration rules, bond for oil and gas 
drilling is set at $5,000, surface owners and developers can appeal to modify the bond 
amount, calls for the creation of an Offshore Energy Management Fund of $500,000,000, 
directs the governor to enter into a regional energy compact with the governors of South 
Carolina and Virginia, creates an Energy Policy Council tasked with increasing energy 
production in the state, and determines how members of the Council will be selected. 
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20. Prevents disclosure of fracking fluids designated as trade secrets, exempt commissions 
charged with fracking regulations from preparing fiscal notes, directs the EMC to 
develop a permitting system for private drinking water wells near contamination sites, 
and repeals the Mountain Resources Planning Act.  
21. Prohibits cost recovery from coal ash spills, the definition of “structural fill” allows for 
the disposal of coal ash in open pit mines, establishes a Coal Ash Management 
Commission, provides for expedited permit review by DENR for coal ash impoundments, 
invalidates local ordinances that regulate coal ash, sets deadlines for the prohibition of the 
construction or expansion of new coal ash impoundments, sets deadlines by which Duke 
Energy must either convert impoundments to dry handling or retire their facilities, creates 
requirements for groundwater assessment plans and corrective action plans, mandates 
well surveys and the replacement of contaminated water, creates requirements for 
assessing and correcting unpermitted discharges, and mandates those discharges be 
eliminated or permitted, Duke Energy must file annual surface water protection and 
restoration plans, directs DENR to classify all coal ash impoundments in terms of their 
risk, Duke Energy must submit impoundment closure plans to DENR, high risk 
impoundments must be closed by Dec. 2019, intermediate risk impoundments by Dec. 
2024, and low risk impoundments by Dec. 2029, high and intermediate risk 
impoundments must be dewatered and converted to industrial landfills with 300 foot 
buffers from surface waters or moved to a landfill, low risk impoundments must be 
dewatered to the maximum extend practicable and capped in place, moved to an 
industrial landfill or be put to beneficial use, mandate structural fill requirements for 
buffer zones to ensure surface water protection, the Dan River, Riverbend, Asheville, and 
Sutton plants are to be classified as high risk and closed by August 2019, establishes a 
partial moratorium on coal ash as structural fill until Aug. 2015, requires that coal ash 
impoundment operators reports spills into surface water to DENR within 24 hours and 
dam owners to report to DENR upon the discovery of the need for emergency repairs, 
and creates new positions within DENR to study and regulate coal ash.  
22. Electric utilities cannot recover the costs of the coal ash spills, moratorium established on 
constructing impoundments starting July 2014 and disposing coal ash into impoundments 
starting July 2014, after Aug. 2014 ash must be disposed of in permitted landfills or put 
to beneficial use, owner of impoundment must test water quality within one-half mile 
boundary of impoundment, impoundments owners must supply potable water to residents 
when contamination is found, closing impoundments prioritized and classified according 
to risk, and closed in order of urgency, impoundment owners must remove all ash from 
impoundments and enclose them in enhanced solid waste landfill on the same property, 
quarterly reports on status of closures, high risk impoundments must be closed as soon as 
possible, moratorium on coal ash as structural fill until further study, wastewater systems 
must report water quality to consumers, high and intermediate hazard dams on coal ash 
impoundments must have emergency action plans, impoundment owners to inspect dams 
on coal ash impoundments weekly, and have them inspected by an engineer annually 
23. Wastewater systems must report water quality to consumers, wastewater treatment 
owners must report coal ash discharges to DENR within 24 hours of spill, impoundment 
owners must submit report evaluating groundwater impacts of coal ash and their plan to 
restore water quality levels using best available technology, operators must supply 
drinking water to residents with nearby wells exceeding groundwater standards, 
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impoundment operators must submit annual water quality reports to DENR, 
impoundments causing water quality violations can either be stopped, captured and 
regulated with an NPDES permitted outfall, operators can address the discharge with 
their own proposed plan, or apply for a discharge permit, high and intermediate hazard 
dams must formulate emergency action plans, owner of impoundment to inspect 
impoundments weekly, DENR to prioritize closing all impoundments, impoundment 
owners propose their own closure plans to restore groundwater standards to economically 
feasible levels, closure may include covering impoundment with a layer of soil, owners 
must develop 30 year post-closure plans, impoundments are exempted from the Dam 
Safety Law of 1967, and expedited closure plans developed for the four highest risk 
impoundments.  
24. See 22. 
25. Extends the deadline for developing the fracking regulatory program to Jan. 2015, 
exempts all commissions involved in fracking activities from preparing fiscal notes, 
DENR and the MEC are authorized to issue fracking permits 61 days after the fracking 
regulatory program becomes effective, the newly renamed N.C. Oil and Gas Commission 
(OGC) shall issue annual as opposed to quarterly reports, delineates how members of the 
OGC will be appointed, makes changes to how members of the N.C. Mining Commission 
will be appointed, makes the formula for fracking fluid accessible to the state geologist, 
relevant state agencies, and emergency responders, but not to the public, establishes a 
drilling fee of $3,000 for the first well and $1,500 for each subsequent well on the same 
pad, and an abandonment fee of $450 per well, presumptive liability for water 
contamination is reduced to a one-half mile radius around a well, developers must 
provide a million-dollar bond to the state in case of environmental damage, required pre-
drilling testing of water supplies around drilling areas is reduced to a one-half mile 
radius, local ordinances against fracking are declared invalid, though zoning restrictions 
still hold, the injection of fracking waste into ground or subsurface water is prohibited, an 
environmental compliance review is required for those seeking a fracking permit, 
establishes a severance tax on natural gas and oil obtained from fracking, issues studies 
on the effect of energy minerals on property taxes, the possibility of constructing a 
liquefied natural gas export terminal in the state, the effect of energy-related transport on 
traffic, the possible establishment of an oil and gas drilling education program in 
community colleges, the issue of compulsory pooling, the construction of midstream 
fracking infrastructure, and a long-range statewide energy policy.  
 
 
Independent Variables 
 Partisanship of the NCGA: As Democrats and Republicans tend to have differing stances 
on the role of environmental regulation, the partisanship of the NCGA at the time of each bill is 
included to measure its effect on the passage of environmentally favorable or unfavorable bills. 
As both the House of Representatives and the Senate changed from a Democratic to a 
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Republican majority at the same time, I combine the two into one measure of overall NCGA 
partisanship.  
 Environmental Aggression: Using the last edition of each bill before it either passed or 
died in committee, I assigned each bill a quantitative measure of the aggressiveness of the sum of 
its provisions. Aggressiveness is defined as how environmentally favorable or unfavorable a bill 
is towards coal ash and fracking regulation. The significant provisions of each bill were coded on 
a 7-point scale of 3 to -3, with positive numbers denoting provisions favorable to environmental 
health, such as increased studies of the environmental impacts of fracking, and negative numbers 
denoting provisions unfavorable to environmental health, such as repealing strict requirements 
for monitoring solid waste landfills.  
 Lobbying Effort of Environmental Groups: Lobbying effort of environmental groups was 
determined by conducting interviews with members of the eight environmental NGOs active in 
lobbying the NCGA. Environmental lobbyists were asked questions about their organization’s 
stance on coal ash and fracking regulation, their group’s number of lobbyists over time from 
2007-2014, which bills pertaining to coal ash and fracking they lobbied for or against during that 
time, their scale of effort on each of those bills, and their overall strategies for lobbying members 
of the NCGA. Scales of effort were either positive or negative values between 100 and -100, 
with positive values signifying that a group supported the bill and wanted it to pass, and negative 
values signifying that a group opposed the bill and did not want it to pass. For example, an effort 
of 10 meant that the group supported the bill but did not exert much lobbying effort toward it, 
perhaps because they suspected it had little chance of making it through committee. An effort of 
-50 meant that a group opposed most of the provisions in a bill and lobbied against its passage 
barring suggested revisions, and a 100 or -100 denoted that a group was either very much in 
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support or in opposition of a bill, and lobbied hard on it. Lobbying effort was averaged by bill to 
ascertain the overall effort of each environmental group towards each bill. 
 Number of Environmental Lobbyists: This is the number of environmental lobbyists that 
were active in all environmental groups at a given time, gleaned from my interviews and the 
Lobbyists Registry on website of the N.C. Department of the Secretary of State. This number is 
specific to each bill to show the exact number of lobbyists that worked on each coal ash or 
fracking-related bill.  
 Number of Industry Lobbyists: This is the number of lobbyists employed by industries in 
the state affiliated with fracking and coal ash, as found on the Lobbyist Directory on the website 
of the N.C. Department of the Secretary of State. The electric utilities that operate coal ash 
disposal sites are Duke Energy and the former Progress Energy Carolinas. The companies that 
have an interest in expanding natural gas production through fracking are the natural gas 
companies PSNC Energy, Piedmont Natural Gas, Triassic Energy Resources, and Koch 
Industries, and the electric utilities that are expanding their natural gas use are Duke Energy and 
Dominion Resources. The number of industry lobbyists is specific to each bill and varies 
according to the year and whether it is coal ash or fracking-related.  
 Monetary Influence of Industrial Interests: Campaign contributions to members of the 
NCGA from the Political Action Committees of industries affiliated with the development of 
fracking and the generation and storage of coal ash are used as a measure for the strength of 
industrial interests. Peoples (2013) finds that monetary contributions, both from PACs and 
individuals, to members of Congress can influence policymaking, with contributors often 
receiving benefits such as less strict regulations in part of an “implicit exchange” with 
policymakers (909). Meta-analyses suggest that campaign contributions may influence 
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congressional roll call voting, particularly concerning non-salient issues (Peoples 2013). Given 
the similar structure between Congress and state legislatures, campaign contributions are 
assumed to similarly affect members of the NCGA.  
 PAC contributions from industrial interests were found on the N.C. State Board of 
Elections website. The companies associated with fracking that gave campaign contributions 
through their PACs are Duke Energy, PSNC Energy, Piedmont Natural Gas, Koch Industries, 
and Dominion Resources. Duke Energy is the only utility currently contributing to coal ash 
impoundments, and campaign contributions from Duke Energy’s two active PACs were 
compiled. The campaign contributions from either the fracking-associated PACs or the coal ash-
associated PACs were compiled by year in order to be linked to each specific bill.  
 Type of Bill: Bills are identified as either being coal ash or fracking-related.  
 
 Dependent Variable 
Environmental Victory: My dependent variable is the legislative success of the eight 
environmental groups that lobbied the NCGA between 2007 and 2014. The bills that the 
environmental groups supported and were passed, and those that the groups opposed and did not 
pass are coded as legislative successes, and the bills that the groups opposed which passed and 
those that they supported but did not pass are counted as legislative failures. Environmental 
groups’ support for each bill is determined by the positive or negative direction of the average of 
their lobbying effort. For the three bills in which no lobbying effort was exerted, H1233, S716, 
and S6, the independent variable environmental aggression is used to determine the groups’ 
support or opposition to the bills. Table 3 shows an aggregation of the dependent variable and 
independent variables by year, and Table 4 gives their descriptive statistics.  
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Table 3: Variables by Year 
Bill Year NCGA 
Partisan- 
ship 
Type 
of 
Bill 
Aggression 
of Bills 
Enviro. 
Lobby 
Effort 
Number 
Enviro. 
Lobbyists 
Number 
Industry 
Lobbyists 
PAC  
money 
(dollars) 
Enviro. 
Victory 
H1233 2007 Dem Coal 1.67 0 0 7 140,300 No 
S716 2007 Dem Coal 1.64 0 0 7 140,300 No 
S1492 2007 Dem Coal 1.56 100 1 7 140,300 Yes 
S6 2007 Dem Coal -2 0 0 7 140,300 No 
H1354 2009 Dem Coal 2.65 5 2 9 262,500 No 
H2012 2010 Dem Coal 2 5 2 9 482,250 No 
S1419 2010 Dem Coal 2 5 2 9 482,250 No 
H722 2011 Rep Coal 2 3.3 2 14 178,500 No 
H242 2011 Rep Frack 0.55 -33.3 4 20 265,925 No 
S615 2011 Rep Frack 1 5 1 20 265,925 No 
S709 2011 Rep Frack -0.57 -100 5 20 265,925 No 
H953 2012 Rep Frack 0.33 -50 2 20 497,680 No 
S820 2012 Rep Frack 0.16 -90 7 20 497,680 No 
H1054 2012 Rep Frack -0.03 -30 4 20 497,680 Yes 
H1064 2012 Rep Frack 0.79 -15 2 20 497,680 Yes 
H1185 2012 Rep Frack 2.5 2.5 1 20 497,680 No 
S328 2013 Rep Coal -1.21 -55 7 10 134,806 Yes 
H613 2013 Rep Coal 1.87 8.3 7 10 134,806 No 
S76 2013 Rep Frack -0.22 -91.6 9 26 219,936 No 
H94 2013 Rep Frack -0.89 -77.5 9 26 219,936 Yes 
S729 2014 Rep Coal 0.67 -39.3 9 10 307,000 No 
H1226 2014 Rep Coal 2.01 16.4 6 10 307,000 No 
H1228 2014 Rep Coal 0.37 -22.8 8 10 307,000 Yes 
S856 2014 Rep Coal 2.01 15 5 10 307,000 No 
S786 2014 Rep Frack -1.08 -100 9 26 500,450 No 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for All Variables 
Variable Observations Minimum  Maximum Mean Standard Dev. 
Environmental Victory 25 0 1 .24 .435889 
NCGA Partisanship 
Dem (1) or Rep (0) 
25 0 1 .28 .458257 
Aggression of Bills 25 -2 2.65 .79 1.28380 
Enviro. Lobby Effort 25 -100 100 -21.56 46.2687 
Number of Enviro. 
Lobbyists 
25 0 9 4.16 3.2104 
Number of Industry 
Lobbyists 
25 7 26 14.68 6.69403 
PAC contributions ($) 25 134,806 500,450 307,632.60 142,858 
Fracking (1) or  
Coal Ash (0) 
25 0 1 .44 .506623 
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 The dependent variable environmental victory in Table 3 shows that there are few 
instances of legislative successes for environmental groups regardless of legislative session. Out 
of the 25 bills, only six bills demonstrated success for environmental groups. In Table 4, the 
mean of environmental victory is .24, demonstrating little overall legislative success for the 
environmental groups.  
 The independent variable partisanship of the NCGA has a mean of .28, showing that the 
NCGA was Republican-majority for most of the time period studied.  Environmental aggression 
has a range of scores from -2, the baseline of environmentally unfavorable bills, to 2.65, the 
highest score of environmentally favorable bills. The mean score of environmental aggression is 
.79, designating that the average bill was coded as having provisions slightly favorable to 
environmental health. Lobbying effort of environmental groups ranges from -100 to 100, with a 
mean of -21.56. This negative mean for the average of lobbying effort shows that environmental 
groups were overall in opposition to the bills. The range of environmental lobbyists is from 0 to 
9, with a mean of 4.16. The range of industry lobbyists is from 7 to 26, with a mean of 14.68. 
This shows that on average, there were about 10 more industry lobbyists at a given time than 
environmental lobbyists. Monetary influence of industrial interests, measured via PAC 
contributions, ranges from $134,806 to $500,450, with a mean of $307,632.60. The mean .44 for 
type of bill indicates that there are more coal ash bills than fracking bills.  
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V. Analysis 
 Logistic regression was used to assess the relationship between the dependent variable 
and the independent variables. Table 5 shows correlations between all variables. Table 6 shows 
the results of the first logistic regression, and Table 7 shows those of the second.  
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix for All Variables 
 envirovict ncgapart aggress. envireffort envirolobbs PAC$ industlobb frack/ 
ash 
envirovict 1.0000        
ncgapart -0.1418 
(0.4988) 
1.0000       
aggression -0.3095 
(0.1321) 
0.2820 
(0.1720) 
1.0000      
enviroeffort 0.0600 
(0.7756) 
0.5226 
(0.0074) 
0.6579 
(0.0004) 
1.0000     
envirolobbs 0.1798 
(0.3897) 
-0.6265 
(0.0008) 
-0.4178 
(0.0377) 
-0.6279 
(0.0008) 
1.0000    
pacmoney -0.0324 
(0.8779) 
-0.2325 
(0.2635) 
0.0645 
(0.7593) 
-0.2606 
(0.2084) 
0.0478 
(0.8206) 
1.0000   
industlobbs 0.0703 
(0.7386) 
-0.6487 
(0.0005) 
-0.4246 
(0.0344) 
-0.6986 
(0.0001) 
0.3961 
(0.0500) 
0.4234 
(0.0350) 
1.0000  
fracking (1) 
coal ash (0) 
0.0679 
(0.7470) 
-0.5528 
(0.0042) 
-0.3948 
(0.0508) 
-0.6092 
(0.0012) 
0.1855 
(0.3747) 
0.4851 
(0.0140) 
0.9401 
(0.0000) 
1.000 
p-values are given in parentheses  
 Unexpectedly, no meaningful relationships were found between the dependent variable 
and any of the independent variables. Such a lack of statistically significant relationships 
between the dependent variable and independent variables is problematic for the confirmation of 
my hypothesis.  
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Table 6: Results of Logistic Regression 1 
envirovict Coefficient Standard Error  z-value P > | z | 
ncgapart -0.1118 1.7737 -0.06 0.950 
enviroeffort 0.02916 0.0215 1.35 0.177 
envirolobbs 0.3306 0.2686 1.23 0.218 
pacmoney 1.7100 4.3200 0.04 0.968 
industlobbs 0.1154 0.1265 0.91 0.362 
N=25    R-squared=0.1141 
 
Table 7: Results of Logistic Regression 2 
envirovict Coefficient Standard Error  z-value P > | z | 
ncgapart -0.5423 1.2919 -0.42 0.675 
aggression -0.5587 0.4035 -1.38 0.166 
N=25    R-squared=0.0930 
 
 The full model failed to converge on all six independent variables and was unable to be 
completely determined. The model successfully ran up to five iterations of the log likelihood, but 
failed on the sixth iteration. This may be attributable to the relatively small number of 
observations in the data. It is possible that 25 observations is too small a population size to 
support a logistic regression with six independent variables.  
 Therefore, the first regression was run without the aggression variable, and the second 
regression was run with aggression and NCGA partisanship. However, neither of these models 
implies that environmental lobbying, when taking into account the aggression of the 
environmental bills, the partisanship of the NCGA, and the lobbying strength and monetary 
influence of industrial interests, has a positive effect on passing environmentally favorable bills. 
These models support the null hypothesis that legislative decisions are unaffected by 
environmental lobbying towards the issues of fracking and coal ash. Though my results imply 
that there is no positive relationship between environmental lobbying and the passage of 
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environmentally favorable legislation, there are many possible explanations for this outcome in 
addition to the null hypothesis.  
 This lack of relationship may be attributed to the relatively small population of fracking 
and coal ash bills generated in the NCGA. The time frame 2007-2014 was chosen to account for 
the change from a Democratic to a Republican majority in both houses of the NCGA, and the 25 
bills are the entire population of bills pertaining to coal ash and fracking regulation in that time 
period. Prior to the partisan turnover in the legislature and the introduction of fracking bills, there 
were fewer environmental lobbyists active lobbying the NCGA on the bills examined in this 
thesis. One of the most prominent environmental organizations did not even lobby the NCGA 
until 2011, as there were fewer environmentally harmful bills to counter. More environmental 
lobbyists began lobbying the NCGA when environmental groups were playing defense against 
the Republican-dominated legislature. The number of both environmental and industry lobbyists 
gradually increased from 2007 to 2014.  
 Another problem may be present in the dependent variable. The dependent variable 
environmental victory has very little variation, with only six out of 25 bills demonstrating 
legislative success for the environmental groups. Contrary to my hypothesis, environmental 
groups actually have marginally more legislative successes after the partisan switchover, with 
five of the environmental victories occurring after 2011. Yet according to representatives from 
the eight environmental groups who lobbied the NCGA during this time frame, the passage of 
pro-environmental legislation has declined drastically after 2011 because environmental issues 
are not a priority for the Republican-majority legislature. While the dependent variable 
accurately portrays environmental victories on the bills according to the framework I designed, it 
may not take into account the general trend towards environmentally unfavorable legislation.  
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 Additionally, it is plausible that the inclusion of the entire population of fracking and coal 
related-bills generated in the NCGA from 2007-2014 incorrectly influenced the data with bills 
that were not very important to the environmental groups. The bill population includes bills that 
were greatly influential as well as bills that received little to no attention from environmental 
groups due to their small scope. For example, S716, S6, and H94 were less consequential to 
environmental groups because they only constitute minor amendments to existing bills. The 
inclusion of such bills may have lessened the strength of the data with bills into which 
environmental groups exerted little effort. Another potentially problematic aspect is the fact that 
for bills that were widely supported by environmental groups, such as H1354, H2012 and S1419, 
S615, H1185, and H613, the groups exerted little to no lobbying effort because the bills had no 
feasible chance of making it through committee without being tabled. For example, one 
prominent environmental group drafted H1226 to give the legislature the option of a robust 
alternative to the Republican’s coal ash bill, yet they did not put forth any lobbying effort on 
their own bill because they knew it had little chance of getting past committee in the Republican-
dominated legislature.  
 There is also an inherent difficulty in attempting to quantify lobbying effort. My system 
of quantifying lobbying effort through assigning negative values to bills environmental groups 
opposed and positive values to those they supported may not account for the multifaceted 
realities of lobbying. I measured the success of environmental lobbying effort by analyzing 
which bills were passed through roll call voting, and measured bill aggressiveness by the last 
version of each bill before it went to a final vote. By doing so, I do not directly take into account 
the legislative activity that precedes roll call voting, such as agenda setting, policy formation, 
and committee votes. Baumgartner and Leech cite Wolpe (1990, 20), who claims that “what 
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happens in committee is the single most important determinant of success or failure [for a 
lobbyist]” (1998, 138). Through this pre-roll call voting activity, bills often change drastically 
from their first version to the final wording that is codified into session law. Both Baumgartner 
and Leech (1998, 138) and Lowery (2013, 13) caution against treating lobbying influence as a 
dichotomous variable of whether a policy proposal passes or fails, as I have done in the research 
design of this thesis. The focus on roll call voting may have contributed to the null finding, as 
this research design omits other avenues for lobbying influence such as agenda setting and policy 
formation in committee.  
 In addition, it is naïve to reduce lobbying effort to a single number. This does not account 
for bills in which lobbyists supported some of its provisions but heavily opposed others, 
particularly in omnibus bills. For example, all environmental groups fully supported that there 
would be a coal ash management bill after the Dan River spill, but generally opposed S729, the 
Coal Ash Management Act 2014, because they did not consider its provisions strict enough to 
avoid further environmental damage. Some groups coded this bill as heavily negative in their 
lobbying effort due to its unfavorable provisions, while others coded it as positive due to their 
desire to have a bill regulating coal ash passed. The overall environmental effort for S729 
amounted to -39, a measure that may or may not accurately portray the groups’ assessment of the 
bill.  
 My system of quantifying lobbying effort by bill may also be problematic due to 
instances where strong relationships between lobbyists and legislators means that little time or 
effort must be exerted in order to convince a legislator to vote according to the lobbyist’s 
preferences. According to one environmental lobbyist, effort is not necessarily equated with 
time, but relationships between legislators and lobbyists. A single number to designate 
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environmental lobbying effort may be insufficient to quantify the strength of interpersonal 
relationships between lobbyists and legislators in direct lobbying, as strong relationships between 
lobbyists and legislators may require little effort but still be effective to support the lobbyist’s 
favored legislation. Another lobbyist noted that lobbying is often less about specific bills than 
about an overall issue and the direction that the lobbyist wants legislators to take on that issue. 
Lobbyists often furnish legislators with fact sheets and advice about their take on an issue, but 
this type of effort does not always pertain to a specific bill rather than an environmental issue 
itself.  
VI. Lobbyist Interviews: Strategies of Environmental Lobbyists  
 The eight environmental groups I interviewed often work together and divide up lobbying 
work. Some groups focus only on coal ash while others work exclusively on fracking, and others 
work on both. All of the environmental lobbyists are in-house lobbyists that are a part of the 
NGOs on behalf of whom they lobby. In contrast, one lobbyist relayed that the majority of 
industrial lobbyists, such as those who work for Duke Energy, are contracted from external law 
and lobbying firms. Most environmental groups that I interviewed practiced similar lobbying 
strategies towards members of the NCGA concerning both coal ash and fracking. All eight 
groups oppose fracking on the grounds that it cannot be done safely in the state in its current 
form, but want to ensure that the necessary safeguards are in place in the likelihood that it does 
happen. All groups agreed that coal ash should be regulated as a hazardous waste and existing 
impoundments should be relocated and put in safe storage away from water sources.  
 The ideologies of the groups vary from staunchly idealistic to pragmatic, yet most groups 
are similar in their approach to lobbying the NCGA. At the group level, the environmental 
groups reported taking part in many activities intended to influence the policymakers and the 
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public and that are outlined in Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 152), including the organization of 
protests and demonstrations, participation in litigation, conferences with the press, the 
endorsement of candidates, the funding of political advertisements, the circulation of petitions, 
and conduction of campaigns to mobilize public support. The groups’ environmental lobbyists 
engage in the direct lobbying of legislators, testify at legislative and committee hearings and 
present research, draft legislation for legislators, and form coalitions with the other 
environmental lobbyists.  
 A point that was continually repeated in interviews with environmental lobbyists was that 
environmentalists have been on the defensive since the Republican takeover in both houses of 
the NCGA and the governorship (Refer to Table 1). On top of this ideological divide, the mean 
number of environmental lobbyists between 2007-2014 is only 4.16, compared to the industrial 
lobbyists’ 14.68. Industrial interests such as Duke Energy have the personnel and resources to 
out-lobby the environmentalists. Non-profits do not give campaign contributions on the scale 
that industrial groups do; industry groups gave an average of $307,632 to members of the NCGA 
from their PACs across the time period studied. According to several lobbyists, industrial groups 
hold a large amount of influence in the legislature. One lobbyist reported that legislators in 
discussion with environmental lobbyists would refuse stricter environmental provisions on a bill 
because Duke Energy lobbyists had “vetoed” the stricter provisions the environmentalists 
proposed.    
 Since 2011, most environmental groups focus on lobbying Republican senators and 
representatives because they hold the power. Environmental lobbyists particularly try to sway 
moderate Republicans, as they are more likely to agree to meet with the environmental lobbyists 
and consider their arguments. Some lobbyists reported that in the current partisan climate, 
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lobbying Republicans is often in vain because many oppose the environmental lobbyists’ 
viewpoints on principal. One lobbyist specified that with Republicans in charge of both 
chambers, much of the environmental lobbyists’ work is trying to prevent environmentally 
harmful bills from ever getting out of committee and coming to a vote. The lobbyist described 
that for both Democrats and Republicans, lobbyists try to make the environmental issue at hand 
pertinent to each legislator and specialized to their individual district if possible to show how 
their voters could be affected. Another lobbyist in a different group specified that their strategy 
for lobbying Republicans began with finding common ground, such as desiring clean water, and 
phrasing certain regulations as strictly necessary for public health in order to be considered. The 
lobbyist related that Republicans are more likely to support hard path measures such as building 
infrastructure like dams and reservoirs, as opposed to the soft path measures like water efficiency 
measures. When referring to environmental issues such as water conservation or energy policy, 
hard path measures refer to centralized infrastructure and technology-driven solutions to increase 
the supply of a resource, whereas soft path measures focus on decentralization and decreasing 
the demand for resources (Sovacool 2011). Another lobbyist stated that environmental lobbyists 
are not the best source to argue for environmentally favorable measures to Republicans, and that 
business interests who have a stake in environmental protection are more likely to have a 
positive effect.  
 Less attention is focused on Democrats, as the NCGA is so divided that Republicans in 
power have little incentive to consider the policy preferences of Democrats. The environmental 
lobbyists collectively stated that part of Republican ideology is lessening governmental 
regulation, and therefore attempting to convince Republicans that increased environmental 
regulation is necessary for public and environmental health is difficult and often fruitless. 
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Environmental lobbyists spend less time on Democratic members except to maintain 
relationships and ensure their continued support, as they are more likely agree with 
environmental lobbyists’ policy preferences. One lobbyist relayed that while Democrats have 
had little power since 2011, lobbyists can go through Democratic legislators to mobilize public 
support against environmentally detrimental bills. Environmental lobbyists furnish amenable 
legislators with fact sheets and information about the issues at hand, and draft new 
environmental bills and amendments to existing bills for the Democrats to present on the floor.  
 Though more environmentally harmful bills passed than favorable ones, environmental 
groups may have mitigated some of the potential damage through adding amendments to bills 
likely to pass. When reflecting on the overall effectiveness of environmental lobbying, a lobbyist 
from a prominent environmental NGO stated that while environmental lobbyists may not be able 
to wholly prevent environmentally unfavorable bills from passing, environmental lobbying is 
effective in ways that are more difficult to quantify. The lobbyist believes that environmental 
lobbying is effective by helping to push forward environmentally favorable amendments to 
unfavorable bills when bills are deliberated during committee meetings, and giving legislators 
agreeable towards their viewpoints talking points during floor debates. The lobbyist holds that 
environmentally positive amendments signify the effectiveness of the practice, though 
environmental gains are smaller overall with the Republican domination of the NCGA.  
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VII. Conclusion 
 This thesis joins the abundance of research on interest group influence that produces null 
findings of lobbying success. As concluded by Lowery (2013, 19), “Influence – in all its forms – 
is very complex and hard to observe. At best, our research designs capture only brief snapshots – 
however important – of influence in democratic systems.” The empirical results of this study do 
not show that environmental lobbying has a statistically significant effect on the passage of 
environmentally favorable legislation. However, this null finding may be due to a myriad of 
factors, including the small population of the 25 bills, the difficulty of quantifying lobbying 
effort, and the lack of inclusion of legislative activity before roll call voting such as policy 
changes made in committee. Given the Republican majority in both houses of the NCGA and the 
governorship, it is likely that smaller environmental victories and “damage control” amendments 
were prevalent before the bills when to a final vote, but my empirical study does not take this 
into account. Interviews with environmental lobbyists show that the legislative activity that 
precedes roll call voting, such as discussions during committee meetings, drafting policy, 
influencing agenda setting, and one-on-one discussions with legislators may have a positive 
effect on moving bills in a more environmentally favorable direction, though bills that are 
generally environmentally unfavorable still pass.  
 The null finding of my empirical study indicates the need for further inquiry into this 
topic.  The effectiveness of environmental NGOs to bring about environmentally favorable 
legislation is an important issue, especially considering the strength and efforts of industrial 
groups seeking to lessen environmental regulations on potentially environmentally destructive 
activities such as fracking and insufficient coal ash storage. Industrial groups have greater 
financial influence and lobbying strength, given their PAC contributions to members of the 
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legislature and their greater numbers of lobbyists than those of environmental groups. Further 
studies should seek to investigate not only whether or not environmental lobbying brings about 
environmentally favorable legislation, but also how this can be done more effectively to counter 
the greater influence of industrial groups.  
 I have several recommendations to improve future study of this topic, stemming from my 
experience and findings during this thesis. First, given the small population of coal ash and 
fracking bills during 2007-2014, the time period under consideration should be expanded to 
allow for the inclusion of more bills. Extending the time frame back in time and up until the 
present would still account for the partisan turnover that occurred in 2011. Second, the 
environmental issues at hand could be expanded to include more than coal ash and fracking in 
order to increase the population size of the bills and to gain a more inclusive view of 
environmental issues in the state. Further study could include legislation pertaining to alternative 
energy, plans for offshore oil drilling, and land conservation measures. Third, the problem of 
quantifying the amount of lobbying effort must be addressed. This may mean a turn in a more 
qualitative direction to describe changes to bills that happen before roll call voting. Additionally, 
the inclusion of only important environmental bills in the dataset, as opposed to also including 
minor bills or amendments that received little attention from environmental groups, would 
strengthen the validity of the data. Environmental groups could be asked to identify which bills 
were most important to them instead of asking them to assign a value of lobbying effort to a list 
of previously compiled bills. Lastly, this study may be expanded to the federal level with 
congressional lobbying, or applied to other states. The format of this study would be easily 
adaptable to other states, with environmental issues unique to their areas and the environmental 
issues salient in their legislatures.  
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